India’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework has gained prominence over the past decade. The concept is often portrayed as the defining lens for New Delhi’s geopolitical engagement. However, this expansive vision obscures a fundamental reality: India’s security, influence, and maritime identity are deeply anchored in the Indian Ocean, not the broader Indo-Pacific.
India’s Indo-Pacific strategy emerged in response to China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and South Asia. While New Delhi shares strategic concerns with Australia, Japan, and the United States – its fellow members in the Quad grouping – India’s Indo-Pacific approach is primarily a means to counterbalance Beijing in its immediate maritime neighborhood. Thus, without a stronghold in the Indian Ocean, India’s Indo-Pacific aspirations remain hollow. The Indian Ocean must remain the centerpiece of India’s maritime strategy for three principal reasons: strategic security, economic imperatives, and geopolitical agency.
Strategic Security: Defending India’s Immediate Maritime Neighborhood
India’s foremost maritime security concerns – piracy, illegal fishing, terrorism, and China’s growing encroachment – are concentrated in the Indian Ocean. China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, with control over ports in Djibouti, Gwadar, and Hambantota, directly challenges India’s regional primacy. India’s counterstrategy, often dubbed the “Necklace of Diamonds,” focuses on strengthening its naval presence and deepening security partnerships within the Indian Ocean. This includes securing access to key maritime chokepoints, enhancing naval infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and promoting closer ties with littoral states such as Mauritius, the Maldives, and Seychelles.
While India is already engaged in these efforts, they remain fragmented and largely reactive. In other words, India’s current engagements in the Indian Ocean are mostly responses to specific challenges – such as China’s expanding presence – rather than being part of a proactive, overarching strategy that consistently prioritizes the region. A more decisive Indian Ocean-first strategy would integrate these individual engagements into a broader framework that consolidates India’s regional leadership and ensures long-term security dominance in these waters.
Although the Indo-Pacific is framed as a unified strategic space, the reality is that India faces more urgent security challenges in the Indian Ocean than in the Pacific. The growing militarization of Chinese facilities in the Indian Ocean, including surveillance operations around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, reveals the pressing need for India to consolidate its defenses closer to home. Before India can extend its power projection to Southeast Asia or the Pacific, it must ensure absolute control over its home waters. An unstable Indian Ocean weakens India’s ability to engage meaningfully in Indo-Pacific security dynamics.
Moreover, unlike other Quad members, which divide the Indian Ocean into two halves and prioritize only its eastern part, India cannot afford such a limited approach. The western Indian Ocean – encompassing key maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, and the Mozambique Channel – directly impacts India’s security and trade. Ignoring these waters would leave India vulnerable to strategic encirclement.
Additionally, the Quad’s overwhelming focus on the Pacific further underscores India’s need to independently secure its Indian Ocean interests. The recent push for the Squad alliance (Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S.) – which explicitly aims to counter China in the Western Pacific and South China Sea – demonstrates how the Quad’s strategic enthusiasm remains heavily Pacific-centric. While this serves the interests of other Quad members, it does little to reinforce India’s Indian Ocean security priorities, reinforcing the need for a regional security coalition that aligns with India’s maritime imperatives.
Economic Imperatives: Trade, Resources, and Strategic Access
Over 90 percent of India’s trade by volume and 70 percent by value passes through the Indian Ocean. The region is also critical for India’s blue economy, with vital fisheries, offshore energy resources, and strategic trade routes. Initiatives like SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) – newly upgraded to MAHASAGAR – emphasize India’s commitment to keeping these waters open, stable, and well-governed.
China’s deepening economic ties with Sri Lanka, its dominant presence in Hambantota, and its recent track record of securing long-term infrastructure projects in East Africa pose long-term risks to India’s ability to influence regional trade. The Indian Ocean is not just a security issue for India; it is an economic lifeline. Without firm control over the region’s sea lanes, India risks losing economic leverage to Beijing, limiting its influence in both regional and global supply chains.
Moreover, the Indian Ocean strategy must be integrated with India’s domestic development priorities, particularly in the Northeast region. Connectivity projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Act East Policy must be leveraged to link Northeast India more effectively with the Bay of Bengal, creating stronger economic corridors through the Indian Ocean. A robust Indian Ocean strategy involving India’s neighboring countries can bridge the economic isolation of Northeast India, which can provide new avenues for trade and maritime connectivity while strengthening India’s presence in the eastern littoral.
Geopolitical Agency: The Limits of Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific is often framed as a seamless strategic space linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, for India, this is only viable if the Indian Ocean remains stable. If India loses strategic control over the Indian Ocean, its influence in the Indo-Pacific collapses. India’s leadership in Quad, ASEAN engagement, and Act East policy hinges on its ability to command the Indian Ocean.
The shortcomings of Indo-Pacific minilateralism have become increasingly evident. While the Quad is often cited as a pillar of India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, its members have not consistently backed India when it mattered most. During India’s border standoff with China in Ladakh in 2020, none of the Quad members extended military or diplomatic deterrence beyond symbolic statements. Similarly, while India prioritizes the Indian Ocean, its Quad partners remain more focused on the Pacific. The United States and Australia are preoccupied with countering China in the South China Sea, while Japan’s primary security concerns lie in the East China Sea. The Quad’s emphasis on freedom of navigation in the Pacific does not directly align with India’s urgent security needs in the Indian Ocean, where Chinese naval deployments continue to rise.
Further, concerns about the future of the Quad under the second Trump administration add another layer of uncertainty. Many analysts fear that President Donald Trump, who famously disdains alliances, could weaken U.S. commitment to minilateral security arrangements like the Quad. If U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific shifts, India may find itself even more reliant on its Indian Ocean strategy to counterbalance China’s growing influence.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean pose direct threats to India’s strategic autonomy. Its investments in Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port), Pakistan (Gwadar Port), and East Africa (Djibouti) give Beijing access to strategic locations, potentially limiting India’s influence in these waters. While the Quad offers a broader strategic framework, India’s real contest with China is unfolding in the Indian Ocean. To counterbalance China, India is expanding its influence through stronger maritime engagements, such as the trilateral maritime security cooperation with Sri Lanka and the Maldives, and extending its presence in key chokepoints like the Mozambique Channel.
The Indo-Pacific is a useful framework, but it must not dilute India’s core strategic focus – the Indian Ocean. This is where India’s security threats are most acute, where its economic interests are most vital, and where it possesses the greatest historical legitimacy. India’s Indo-Pacific vision will remain aspirational unless anchored in a robust Indian Ocean strategy. The Indian Ocean is not a stepping stone to the Indo-Pacific but the mainstay of India’s maritime and strategic calculus. Without it, India’s Indo-Pacific ambitions are adrift.
